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Introduction
Iraqi President Barham Salih announced on 7 April 2019 a bill to the
Iraqi parliament for review and adoption, entitled “Yazidi Female
Survivors’ Law”. The ground-breaking bill sets forth a number of
reparation measures for female Yazidi survivors of captivity, which is
the  rst attempt by the Iraqi government to redress the harm suffered
by its ethno-religious Yazidi minority as a result of the genocidal
campaign initiated by the so-called Islamic State (IS) in 2014. A new
legal framework is likely being proposed since it became clear that the
existing reparation scheme under Law No. 20 (Compensation for
Victims of Military Operations, Military Mistakes and Terrorist Actions)
is severely insu cient to address the aftermath of the IS con ict.
Prominent Yazidi NGO Yazda praised the bill, commenting that “this is
the most signi cant piece of legislation ever with respect to the Yazidis
in Iraq to be discussed within the framework for Iraq.” While that is
indeed true, the bill also raises some concerns and confusions which
need addressing before its enactment.
Narrow De nition of Victims and Violations
The bill applies to “Yazidi women survivors who were abducted by the
Da’esh terrorist gangs after 10/6/2014 and released after this date.”
This prioritisation is not surprising, as the plight of thousands of Yazidi
women who were sexually enslaved by IS is well documented. However,
the bill mentions abduction only, refraining from explicitly referring to
sexual slavery, rape and other con ict-related sexual violence (CRSV)
crimes, which undermines the full range of harm women experienced in
IS captivity, and carries the risk of silencing survivors, as well as
exacerbating stigma. CRSV should be adequately de ned, by ensuring
that no victim falls out of the bill’s scope.
At the same time, limiting the violations to be addressed under the
reparation program for Yazidi women to CRSV alone disregards other
gendered harms experienced by Yazidi women in con ict, possibly over-
sexualizing Yazidi women and reinforcing patriarchal attributes of
“chastity”. Furthermore, not all Yazidi women who were abducted by IS
were subjected to CRSV, as there are documented cases of abducted
older or disabled Yazidi women who were not sexually abused, yet
subjected to other gross human rights violations. Yazidi women who
were subjected to CRSV also experienced different forms over a range
of time spans. A one-size- ts-all approach to different groups of victims
may fall short of addressing the unique impacts of different violations.
The bill is internally inconsistent: while Article 2 states that the law shall
apply to Yazidi women who were abducted by IS, Article 13 speci es
that the “law shall apply to all women abductees who survived the
terrorist organization Daesh and who were subjected to enslavement.”
(emphasis added) This warrants clari cation as to who is eligible for
reparations. Are non-Yazidi women included? Is the violation covered
here abduction or enslavement?
As is known, Shi’i Turkmen, Christian and Shabak women captured by IS
were also subjected to CRSV crimes. Furthermore, there are reports of
CRSV being committed against Sunni Arab women by IS, as well as
sexual abuse of women a liated with IS by security forces in IDP
camps. While women and girls have undoubtedly been
disproportionately subjected to CRSV in the IS con ict, men and
boys and LGBTI+ persons were also victims of such crimes. Prioritising
a certain group of victims may lead to inter-community tensions and
cause the excluded victims feeling left out, exacerbating divisions.
Importantly, the bill excludes from its scope Yazidi victims other than
abducted women. IS committed several genocidal acts other than
sexual violence towards men, women and children, as detailed in
the Human Rights Council report. The bill does not foresee any
reparation measures for such groups, nor does it acknowledge that
those acts constitute genocide, as Article 9 recognises only that “the
crimes committed against female survivors shall be considered
genocide crimes.” The bill contradicts itself here since its rationale
states “the crimes committed by the terrorist cohorts of Daesh groups
against the Yazidis amount to genocide according to international
standards.” Leaving out crimes committed against other Yazidi victims
from the recognition of genocide and the scope of the reparation
program may re-victimise those who are excluded and lead to intra-
community tensions. It will also present an insu cient record of events.
Similarly, no reparations are envisioned for non-Yazidi victims of gross
human rights violations, a  aw that could deepen the divide between
different groups in Iraq and severely halt reconciliation efforts. Perhaps
Iraq will deal with reparations for other victims under separate laws, as
observed in Argentina. Nevertheless, advocating for redress for all
victims while there is momentum and political will is crucial.
Kine Haji, 37, ran with her children from her village near Sinjar city,
carrying her youngest daughter on her shoulders. Her other children ran
with her, barefoot. She  ed after witnessing her husband killed by ISIL
troops. Photo credit: Caroline Gluck/EU/ECHO.
Top-down identi cation of bene ts
A well-designed reparation programme is complex, i.e. combining
different bene ts. These bene ts are best identi ed through
consultations, as survivors will know best what they need.
The bill provides for psychological and medical care, housing, land,
compensation, education, and livelihood measures for Yazidi women,
as well as commemoration and memorialisation activities. By
combining forms of compensation, restitution, rehabilitation and
satisfaction, the bill appears to be quite complex and is praiseworthy in
that regard. Article 8/1 of the bill foresees monthly pensions instead of
a lump sum payment, which is in line with best practices on
compensation for survivors of CRSV, and provides clear criteria on
determining the level of compensation (“no less than twice the
minimum pension stipulated in the Uni ed Retirement Law”). It
emphasises rehabilitation and reintegration measures directed at
survivors, in addition to reinforcing infrastructure in areas where
survivors are located, although it doesn’t clarify how these will take
place or for how long they will be offered. The inclusion of
memorialisation measures as part of symbolic reparation are
noteworthy, yet which form these will take must be decided after
extensive consultation with survivors.
Still, the bill seems to have been drafted without su cient victim
participation, as it leaves out one of the main demands of survivors.
During my research under the Con ict Research Programme, survivors
prioritised their demands as indirect victims of killings and enforced
disappearances committed against their families, rather than their
demands as direct victims of CRSV. The survivors primarily asked for
locating their missing family members and exhuming mass graves to
bury their loved ones in a digni ed manner. This isn’t to suggest that
measures aimed at redressing the harm arising from CRSV shouldn’t be
regulated. To the contrary, reparations for CRSV should be provided, and
distinctly from reparations directed at harm arising from other
violations. However, victim consultation during the drafting of the law
could have made it clear that Yazidi women have several demands to
redress various harms arising from different violations, and allowed a
draft that better responds to the expectations of survivors. Such bill
would include, most importantly, rescue efforts for those still under
captivity.
Another troublesome feature of the bill is the lack of measures directed
at guaranteeing non-repetition. Such measures are crucial as they hold
potential to actually transform unequal social norms, addressing stigma
arising from CRSV and gender inequality that underlies it. Non-repetition
measures may take various forms, from institutional reform to public
education initiatives. A good start would be to amend the sexual
violence provisions of the Iraqi Penal Code, which are
way behind international standards.
One of the most challenging issues many survivors currently deal with
is making the choice to return to their community without children born
of rape, or to stay with their children. The issue was further complicated
when the Yazidi Supreme Spiritual Council  rst declared that children
born of rape will be accepted to the community, then revoked its
decision three days later following backlash from the community. The
Iraqi government has to date done nothing to amend laws that impose
the Muslim religion onto children born to Yazidi mothers. The bill tries
but fails to provide redress, instead rea rming “the legal situation of
children born of surviving mothers in accordance with the law”, and that
“the existing laws shall apply to the new born of a Yazidi female
survivor.” What bene t these provisions bring to Yazidi survivors is
unclear.
Mitigating Possible Risks arising from Implementation
The bill includes the establishment of a General Directorate for Female
Survivors Affairs under the General Secretariat of the Council of
Ministers. Creating a separate body dedicated to reparations for female
survivors, instead of incorporating this work under an existing body with
other responsibilities such as the Martyrs’ Foundation, is favourable in
terms of independence and e ciency. The General Directorate shall be
headed by a Yazidi, which is preferable for representation but again
carries the risk of alienating victims from other groups. Management of
the General Directorate should also include representatives of other
victim groups.
The General Directorate is to be established in Nineveh, which is where
the Yazidi homeland Sinjar is located. However, a majority of survivors
are displaced and currently live in Duhok, Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and
access could therefore be tricky. Obstacles in access are currently
observed in  ling claims to Compensation Sub-Committees as per Law
No. 20, since there are no o ces or sub-committees located in Duhok.
The tense relations between Baghdad and Erbil shouldn’t impact the
survivors’ access to the General Directorate, and o ces should be
established in and around Duhok and other places heavily populated by
survivors to maximize the programme’s reach. The scope of the bill
should also include survivors who have re-located abroad.
A troubling provision is Article 5/1, which provides that the General
Directorate shall “count and prepare female survivors’ data.” This is
worrisome because this information has already been collected by
government agencies and numerous NGOs, and re-interviewing
survivors is re-traumatizing. In line with the principle of “do no harm”,
the General Directorate should liaise with other o ces who have already
undertaken such work, such as the Commission of Investigation and
Gathering Evidence of the Kurdistan Regional Government. The United
Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes
Committed by Da’esh (UNITAD) can also be a source of support here, in
addition to several civil society organisations such as Yazda who have
been documenting IS crimes committed against the Yazidis.
Establishing contact with such institutions in the early stages of
planning could help access crucial data such as age, level of education,
level of income, and types and consequences of violations, while
preventing re-traumatisation that could arise from repeated
documentation.
The bill is silent on how survivors will be registered to the programme,
the evidentiary requirements, and the modes of distribution of
reparations. Victim consultation particularly on these elements is key to
maximise reach. Finally, the bill doesn’t mention speci cs of  nancing
or oversight, two important components which will presumably be dealt
with later on as part of setting up the programme.
Lack of Links to other Transitional Justice Mechanisms
Reparation programmes should go hand in hand with criminal justice,
institutional reform and truth-seeking, what Pablo de
Greiff calls “external coherence”. The reparation bill makes no reference
to truth-seeking, which may cause its intended bene ciaries to perceive
this programme as “blood money”, to buy their forgiveness. Institutional
reform is crucial to change the system which allowed such violations to
occur in the  rst place, which would also help re-establish trust to the
state.
Article 11 provides that “perpetrators of the crime of abduction and
enslavement of the Yazidi women are not included in any general or
special amnesty” (note once again the use of “enslavement”). The bill
goes on to provide for the arrest of perpetrators, protection of
witnesses and survivors, and cooperation for the extradition of
perpetrators. The explicit reference to prosecution and the exclusion of
an amnesty is encouraging, as Iraq is yet to prosecute any member of IS
speci cally for their crimes against Yazidi women. Still, the bill provides
for prosecution of kidnapping, not sexual violence, and not sexual
violence as genocide. How these prosecutions will take place,
given gaps in Iraqi law, is unclear.
Conclusion
The reparation bill is a step in the right direction, albeit a small one.
Recognition of the Yazidi Genocide by the Iraqi government has been a
long-awaited move by the Yazidis. Inclusion of complex measures to
address the harm faced by thousands of Yazidi women is very much
welcomed. It appears, however, that the bill lacks both victim and expert
consultation, which is evident from the confusion and inconsistencies
in its wording and disregard for key demands of the Yazidi community,
such as rescue efforts for those still in captivity. The main concerns on
inclusivity of both members of the Yazidi community other than women,
and members of communities other than the Yazidi, should be primarily
addressed. Eligibility criteria should be clearly de ned and justi ed.
Reparations should be designed with extensive survivor consultation, by
keeping in mind their possible transformative effects.
Despite its shortcomings, the bill succeeds in opening up space for
further debate on the issue of reparations in Iraq post-IS, which is a
positive development by itself. Hopefully, this bill will be a  rst of many
steps leading to a comprehensive, holistic, and survivor-centric
reparation programme.
This blogpost is part of the LSE research project Reforming Legal
Responses to Con ict-Related Sexual Violence in Iraq and the Kurdistan
Region by Güley Bor, examining how laws in Iraq could be reformed to
provide better response to female survivors of con ict-related sexual
violence. This project forms part of the Con ict Research Programme,
funded by the UK Department for International Development.
Note: This post was revised to re ect the Yazidi Supreme Spiritual
Council’s decision not to accept children born of rape.
Note: The CRP blogs gives the views of the author, not the position of
the Con ict Research Programme, the London School of Economics
and Political Science, or the UK Government.
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